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Abstract
Among the now numerous alternative cryptocurren-
cies derived from Bitcoin, Zcash is often touted as the
one with the strongest anonymity guarantees, due to its
basis in well-regarded cryptographic research. In this
paper, we examine the extent to which anonymity is
achieved in the deployed version of Zcash. We investi-
gate all facets of anonymity in Zcash’s transactions, rang-
ing from its transparent transactions to the interactions
with and within its main privacy feature, a shielded pool
that acts as the anonymity set for users wishing to spend
coins privately. We conclude that while it is possible to
use Zcash in a private way, it is also possible to shrink its
anonymity set considerably by developing simple heuris-
tics based on identifiable patterns of usage.
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2008 [34], cryptocur-
rencies have become increasingly popular to the point of
reaching a near-mania, with thousands of deployed cryp-
tocurrencies now collectively attracting trillions of dol-
lars in investment. While the broader positive potential
of “blockchain” (i.e., the public decentralized ledger un-
derlying almost all cryptocurrencies) is still unclear, de-
spite the growing number of legitimate users there are
today still many people using these cryptocurrencies for
less legitimate purposes. These range from the purchase
of drugs or other illicit goods on so-called dark markets
such as Dream Market, to the payments from victims
in ransomware attacks such as WannaCry, with many
other crimes in between. Criminals engaged in these
activities may be drawn to Bitcoin due to the relatively
low friction of making international payments using only
pseudonyms as identifiers, but the public nature of its
ledger of transactions raises the question of how much
anonymity is actually being achieved.
Indeed, a long line of research [38, 39, 12, 27, 41] has
by now demonstrated that the use of pseudonymous ad-
dresses in Bitcoin does not provide any meaningful level
of anonymity. Beyond academic research, companies
now provide analysis of the Bitcoin blockchain as a busi-
ness [19]. This type of analysis was used in several ar-
rests associated with the takedown of Silk Road [20], and
to identify the attempts of the WannaCry hackers to move
their ransom earnings from Bitcoin into Monero [17].
Perhaps in response to this growing awareness that
most cryptocurrencies do not have strong anonymity
guarantees, a number of alternative cryptocurrencies or
other privacy-enhancing techniques have been deployed
with the goal of improving on these guarantees. The
most notable cryptocurrencies that fall into this former
category are Dash [2] (launched in January 2014), Mon-
ero [3] (April 2014), and Zcash [7] (October 2016). At
the time of this writing all have a market capitalization of
over 1 billion USD [1], although this figure is notoriously
volatile, so should be taken with a grain of salt.
Even within this category of privacy-enhanced cryp-
tocurrencies, and despite its relative youth, Zcash stands
somewhat on its own. From an academic perspective,
Zcash is backed by highly regarded research [28, 13],
and thus comes with seemingly strong anonymity guar-
antees. Indeed, the original papers cryptographically
prove the security of the main privacy feature of Zcash
(known as the shielded pool), in which users can spend
shielded coins without revealing which coins they have
spent. These strong guarantees have attracted at least
some criminal attention to Zcash: the underground mar-
ketplace AlphaBay was on the verge of accepting it be-
fore their shutdown in July 2017 [11], and the Shadow
Brokers hacking group started accepting Zcash in May
2017 (and in fact for their monthly dumps accepted ex-
clusively Zcash in September 2017) [16].
Despite these theoretical privacy guarantees, the de-
ployed version of Zcash does not require all transac-
tions to take place within the shielded pool itself: it
also supports so-called transparent transactions, which
are essentially the same as transactions in Bitcoin in
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that they reveal the pseudonymous addresses of both the
senders and recipients, and the amount being sent. It
does require, however, that all newly generated coins
pass through the shielded pool before being spent fur-
ther, thus ensuring that all coins have been shielded at
least once. This requirement led the Zcash developers
to conclude that the anonymity set for users spending
shielded coins is in fact all generated coins, and thus
that “the mixing strategies that other cryptocurrencies
use for anonymity provide a rather small [anonymity set]
in comparison to Zcash” and that “Zcash has a distinct
advantage in terms of transaction privacy” [9].
In this paper, we provide the first in-depth empirical
analysis of anonymity in Zcash, in order to examine these
claims and more generally provide a longitudinal study
of how Zcash has evolved and who its main participants
are. We begin in Section 4 by providing a general exam-
ination of the Zcash blockchain, from which we observe
that the vast majority of Zcash activity is in the transpar-
ent part of the blockchain, meaning it does not engage
with the shielded pool at all. In Section 5, we explore this
aspect of Zcash by adapting the analysis that has already
been developed for Bitcoin, and find that exchanges typ-
ically dominate this part of the blockchain.
We then move in Section 6 to examining interactions
with the shielded pool. We find that, unsurprisingly, the
main actors doing so are the founders and miners, who
are required to put all newly generated coins directly into
it. Using newly developed heuristics for attributing trans-
actions to founders and miners, we find that 65.6% of
the value withdrawn from the pool can be linked back
to deposits made by either founders or miners. We also
implement a general heuristic for linking together other
types of transactions, and capture an additional 3.5% of
the value using this. Our relatively simple heuristics thus
reduce the size of the overall anonymity set by 69.1%.
In Section 7, we then look at the relatively small per-
centage of transactions that have taken place within the
shielded pool. Here, we find (perhaps unsurprisingly)
that relatively little information can be inferred, although
we do identify certain patterns that may warrant further
investigation. Finally, we perform a small case study of
the activities of the Shadow Brokers within Zcash in Sec-
tion 8, and in Section 9 we conclude.
All of our results have been disclosed, at the time of
the paper’s submission, to the creators of Zcash, and dis-
cussed extensively with them since. This has resulted
in changes to both their public communication about
Zcash’s anonymity as well as the transactional behavior
of the founders. Additionally, all the code for our analy-
sis is available as an open-source repository.1
1https://github.com/manganese/zcash-empirical-analysis
2 Related work
We consider as related all work that has focused on the
anonymity of cryptocurrencies, either by building so-
lutions to achieve stronger anonymity guarantees or by
demonstrating its limits.
In terms of the former, there has been a significant
volume of research in providing solutions for existing
cryptocurrencies that allow interested users to mix their
coins in a way that achieves better anonymity than reg-
ular transactions [15, 42, 21, 24, 40, 14, 22, 25]. An-
other line of research has focused on producing alterna-
tive privacy-enhanced cryptocurrencies. Most notably,
Dash [2] incorporates the techniques of CoinJoin [24] in
its PrivateSpend transactions; Monero [3, 35] uses ring
signatures to allow users to create “mix-ins” (i.e., include
the keys of other users in their own transactions as a way
of providing a larger anonymity set); and Zcash [7, 13]
uses zero-knowledge proofs to allow users to spend coins
without revealing which coins are being spent.
In terms of the latter, there has also been a significant
volume of research on de-anonymizing Bitcoin [38, 39,
12, 27, 41]. Almost all of these attacks follow the same
pattern: they first apply so-called clustering heuristics
that associate multiple different addresses with one sin-
gle entity, based on some evidence of shared ownership.
The most common assumption is that all input addresses
in a transaction belong to the same entity, with some pa-
pers [12, 27] also incorporating an additional heuristic in
which output addresses receiving change are also linked.
Once these clusters are formed, a “re-identification at-
tack” [27] then tags specific addresses and thus the clus-
ters in which they are contained. These techniques have
also been applied to alternative cryptocurrencies with
similar types of transactions, such as Ripple [30].
The work that is perhaps closest to our own focuses on
de-anonymizing the privacy solutions described above,
rather than just on Bitcoin. Here, several papers have
focused on analyzing so-called privacy overlays or mix-
ing services for Bitcoin [33, 26, 31, 32], and considered
both their level of anonymity and the extent to which
participants must trust each other. Some of this analy-
sis [32, 26] also has implications for anonymity in Dash,
due to its focus on CoinJoin. More recently, Miller et
al. [29] and Kumar et al. [23] looked at Monero. They
both found that it was possible to link together trans-
actions based on temporal patterns, and also based on
certain patterns of usage, such as users who choose to
do transactions with 0 mix-ins (in which case their ring
signature provides no anonymity, which in turns affects
other users who may have included their key in their
own mix-ins). Finally, we are aware of one effort to
de-anonymize Zcash, by Quesnelle [37]. This article fo-
cuses on linking together the transactions used to shield
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Figure 1: A simple diagram illustrating the different types of
Zcash transactions. All transaction types are depicted and de-
scribed with respect to a single input and output, but can be
generalized to handle multiple inputs and outputs. In a t-to-
t transaction, visible quantities of ZEC move between visible
t-addresses (zIn,zOut 6= /0). In a t-to-z transaction, a visible
amount of ZEC moves from a visible t-address into the shielded
pool, at which point it belongs to a hidden z-address (zOut
= /0). In a z-to-z transaction, a hidden quantity of ZEC moves
between hidden z-addresses (zIn,zOut = /0). Finally, in a z-
to-t transaction, a hidden quantity of ZEC moves from a hid-
den z-address out of the shielded pool, at which point a visible
quantity of it belongs to a visible t-address (zIn = /0).
and deshield coins, based on their timing and the amount
sent in the transactions. In comparison, our paper imple-
ments this heuristic but also provides a broader perspec-
tive on the entire Zcash ecosystem, as well as a more
in-depth analysis of all interactions with (and within) the
shielded pool.
3 Background
3.1 How Zcash works
Zcash (ZEC) is an alternative cryptocurrency developed
as a (code) fork of Bitcoin that aims to break the link be-
tween senders and recipients in a transaction. In Bitcoin,
recipients receive funds into addresses (referred to as the
vOut in a transaction), and when they spend them they do
so from these addresses (referred to as the vIn in a trans-
action). The act of spending bitcoins thus creates a link
between the sender and recipient, and these links can be
followed as bitcoins continue to change hands. It is thus
possible to track any given bitcoin from its creation to its
current owner.
Any transaction which interacts with the so-called
shielded pool in Zcash does so through the inclusion of
a vJoinSplit, which specifies where the coins are com-
ing from and where they are going. To receive funds,
users can provide either a transparent address (t-address)
or a shielded address (z-address). Coins that are held in
z-addresses are said to be in the shielded pool.
To specify where the funds are going, a vJoinSplit
contains (1) a list of output t-addresses with funds as-
signed to them (called zOut), (2) two shielded outputs,
and (3) an encrypted memo field. The zOut can be
empty, in which case the transaction is either shielded (t-
to-z) or private (z-to-z), depending on the inputs. If the
zOut list contains a quantity of ZEC not assigned to any
address, then we still consider it to be empty (as this is
simply the allocation of the miner’s fee). Each shielded
output contains an unknown quantity of ZEC as well as a
hidden double-spending token. The shielded output can
be a dummy output (i.e., it contains zero ZEC) to hide
the fact that there is no shielded output. The encrypted
memo field can be used to send private messages to the
recipients of the shielded outputs.
To specify where the funds are coming from, a vJoin-
Split also contains (1) a list of input t-addresses (called
zIn), (2) two double-spending tokens, and (3) a zero-
knowledge proof. The zIn can be empty, in which case
the transaction is either deshielded (z-to-t) if zOut is not
empty, or private (z-to-z) if it is. Each double-spending
token is either a unique token belonging to some pre-
vious shielded output, or a dummy value used to hide
the fact that there is no shielded input. The double-
spending token does not reveal to which shielded out-
put it belongs. The zero-knowledge proof guarantees
two things. First, it proves that the double-spending to-
ken genuinely belongs to some previous shielded output.
Second, it proves that the sum of (1) the values in the
addresses in zIn plus (2) the values represented by the
double-spending tokens is equal to the sum of (1) the val-
ues assigned to the addresses in zOut plus (2) the values
in the shielded outputs plus (3) the miner’s fee. A sum-
mary of the different types of transactions is in Figure 1.
3.2 Participants in the Zcash ecosystem
In this section we describe four types of participants who
interact in the Zcash network.
Founders took part in the initial creation and release of
Zcash, and will receive 20% of all newly generated coins
(currently 2.5 ZEC out of the 12.5 ZEC block reward).
The founder addresses are specified in the Zcash chain
parameters [8].
Miners take part in the maintenance of the ledger, and
in doing so receive newly generated coins (10 out of the
12.5 ZEC block reward), as well as any fees from the
transactions included in the blocks they mine. Many
miners choose not to mine on their own, but join a mining
pool; a list of mining pools can be found in Table 4. One
or many miners win each block, and the first transaction
in the block is a coin generation (coingen) that assigns
newly generated coins to their address(es), as well as to
the address(es) of the founders.
Services are entities that accept ZEC as some form of
payment. These include exchanges like Bitfinex, which
allow users to trade fiat currencies and other cryptocur-
rencies for ZEC (and vice versa), and platforms like
ShapeShift [4], which allow users to trade within cryp-
tocurrencies and other digital assets without requiring
registration.
Finally, users are participants who hold and transact
in ZEC at a more individual level. In addition to regu-
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Type Number Percentage
Transparent 1,648,745 73.5
Coingen 258,472 11.5
Deshielded 177,009 7.9
Shielded 140,796 6.3
Mixed 10,891 0.5
Private 6934 0.3
Table 1: The total number of each transaction type.
lar individuals, this category includes charities and other
organizations that may choose to accept donations in
Zcash. A notable user is the Shadow Brokers, a hacker
group who have published several leaks containing hack-
ing tools from the NSA and accept payment in Zcash. We
explore their usage of Zcash in Section 8.
4 General Blockchain Statistics
We used the zcashd client to download the Zcash
blockchain, and loaded a database representation of it
into Apache Spark. We then performed our analy-
sis using a custom set of Python scripts equipped with
PySpark. We last parsed the block chain on January 21
2018, at which point 258,472 blocks had been mined.
Overall, 3,106,643 ZEC had been generated since the
genesis block, out of which 2,485,461 ZEC went to the
miners and the rest (621,182 ZEC) went to the founders.
4.1 Transactions
Across all blocks, there were 2,242,847 transactions. A
complete breakdown of the transaction types is in Ta-
ble 1, and graphs depicting the growth of each transac-
tion type over time are in Figures 2 and 3.2 The vast ma-
jority of transactions are public (i.e., either transparent
or a coin generation). Of the transactions that do inter-
act with the pool (335,630, or 14.96%, in total), only a
very small percentage are private transactions; i.e., trans-
actions within the pool. Looking at the types of trans-
actions over time in Figure 2, we can see that the num-
ber of coingen, shielded, and deshielded transactions all
grow in an approximately linear fashion. As we explore
in Section 6.2, this correlation is due largely to the habits
of the miners. Looking at both this figure and Figure 3,
we can see that while the number of transactions interact-
ing with the pool has grown in a relatively linear fashion,
the value they carry has over time become a very small
percentage of all blocks, as more mainstream (and thus
transparent) usage of Zcash has increased.
2We use the term ‘mixed’ to mean transactions that have both a vIn
and a vOut, and a vJoinSplit.
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Figure 2: The total number of each of the different types of
transactions over time.
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Figure 3: The fraction of the value in each block represent-
ing each different type of transaction over time, averaged daily.
Here, ‘public’ captures both transparent transactions and the
visible components of mixed transactions.
4.2 Addresses
Across all transactions, there have been 1,740,378 dis-
tinct t-addresses used. Of these, 8,727 have ever acted as
inputs in a t-to-z transaction and 330,780 have ever acted
as outputs in a z-to-t transaction. As we explore in Sec-
tion 6.2, much of this asymmetry is due to the behavior of
mining pools, which use a small number of addresses to
collect the block reward, but a large number of addresses
(representing all the individual miners) to pay out of the
pool. Given the nature of the shielded pool, it is not pos-
sible to know the total number of z-addresses used.
Figure 4 shows the total value in the pool over time.
Although the overall value is increasing over time, there
are certain shielding and de-shielding patterns that create
spikes. As we explore in Section 6, these spikes are due
largely to the habits of the miners and founders. At the
time of writing, there are 112,235 ZEC in the pool, or
3.6% of the total monetary supply.
If we rank addresses by their wealth, we first observe
that only 25% of all t-addresses have a non-zero bal-
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Figure 4: The total value in the shielded pool over time.
ance. Of these, the top 1% hold 78% of all ZEC. The
address with the highest balance had 118,257.75 ZEC,
which means the richest address has a higher balance
than the entire shielded pool.
5 T-Address Clustering
As discussed in Section 4, a large proportion of the activ-
ity on Zcash does not use the shielded pool. This means
it is essentially identical to Bitcoin, and thus can be de-
anonymized using the same techniques discussed for Bit-
coin in Section 2.
5.1 Clustering addresses
To identify the usage of transparent addresses, we be-
gin by recalling the “multi-input” heuristic for clustering
Bitcoin addresses. In this heuristic, addresses that are
used as inputs to the same transaction are assigned to the
same cluster. In Bitcoin, this heuristic can be applied to
all transactions, as they are all transparent. In Zcash, we
perform this clustering as long as there are multiple input
t-addresses.
Heuristic 1. If two or more t-addresses are inputs in the
same transaction (whether that transaction is transparent,
shielded, or mixed), then they are controlled by the same
entity.
In terms of false positives, we believe that these are
at least as unlikely for Zcash as they are for Bitcoin, as
Zcash is a direct fork of Bitcoin and the standard client
has the same behavior. In fact, we are not aware of any
input-mixing techniques like CoinJoin [24] for Zcash, so
could argue that the risk of false positives is even lower
than it is for Bitcoin. As this heuristic has already been
used extensively in Bitcoin, we thus believe it to be real-
istic for use in Zcash.
We implemented this heuristic by defining each t-
address as a node in a graph, and adding an (undirected)
edge in the graph between addresses that had been in-
put to the same transaction. The connected components
of the graph then formed the clusters, which represent
distinct entities controlling potentially many addresses.
The result was a set of 560,319 clusters, of which 97,539
contained more than a single address.
As in Bitcoin, using just this one heuristic is already
quite effective but does not capture the common usage of
change addresses, in which a transaction sends coins to
the actual recipient but then also sends any coins left over
in the input back to the sender. Meiklejohn et al. [27] use
in their analysis a heuristic based on this behavior, but
warn that it is somewhat fragile. Indeed, their heuris-
tic seems largely dependent on the specific behavior of
several large Bitcoin services, so we chose not to imple-
ment it in its full form. Nevertheless, we did use a related
Zcash-specific heuristic in our case study of the Shadow
Brokers in Section 8.
Heuristic 2. If one (or more) address is an input t-
address in a vJoinSplit transaction and a second address
is an output t-address in the same vJoinSplit transaction,
then if the size of zOut is 1 (i.e., this is the only trans-
parent output address), the second address belongs to the
same user who controls the input addresses.
To justify this heuristic, we observe that users may
not want to deposit all of the coins in their address
when putting coins into the pool, in which case they
will have to make change. The only risk of a false pos-
itive is if users are instead sending money to two sep-
arate individuals, one using a z-address and one using
a t-address. One notable exception to this rule is users
of the zcash4win wallet. Here, the address of the wal-
let operator is an output t-address if the user decides to
pay the developer fee, so would produce exactly this type
of transaction for users putting money into the shielded
pool. This address is identifiable, however, so these types
of transactions can be omitted from our analysis. Never-
theless, due to concerns about the safety of this heuristic
(i.e., its ability to avoid false positives), we chose not to
incorporate it into our general analysis below.
5.2 Tagging addresses
Having now obtained a set of clusters, we next sought to
assign names to them. To accomplish this, we performed
a scaled-down version of the techniques used by Meik-
lejohn et al. [27]. In particular, given that Zcash is still
relatively new, there are not many different types of ser-
vices that accept Zcash. We thus restricted ourselves to
interacting with exchanges.
We first identified the top ten Zcash exchanges accord-
ing to volume traded [1]. We then created an account
with each exchange and deposited a small quantity of
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Service Cluster # deposits # withdrawals
Binance 7 1 1
Bitfinex 3 4 1
Bithumb 14 2 1
Bittrex 1 1 1
Bit-z 30 2 1
Exmo 4 2 1
HitBTC 18 1 1
Huobi 26 2 1
Kraken 12 1 1
Poloniex 0 1 1
ShapeShift 2 1 1
zcash4win 139 1 2
Table 2: The services we interacted with, the identifier of the
cluster they were associated with after running Heuristic 1, and
the number of deposits and withdrawals we did with them. The
first ten are exchanges, ShapeShift is an inter-cryptocurrency
exchange, and zcash4win is a Windows-based Zcash client.
ZEC into it, tagging as we did the output t-addresses in
the resulting transaction as belonging to the exchange.
We then withdrew this amount to our own wallet, and
again tagged the t-addresses (this time on the sender side)
as belonging to the exchange. We occasionally did sev-
eral deposit transactions if it seemed likely that doing so
would tag more addresses. Finally, we also interacted
with ShapeShift, which as mentioned in Section 3.2 al-
lows users to move amongst cryptocurrencies without the
need to create an account. Here we did a single “shift”
into Zcash and a single shift out. A summary of our in-
teractions with all the different exchanges is in Table 2.
Finally, we collected the publicized addresses of the
founders [8], as well as addresses from known mining
pools. For the latter we started by scraping the tags of
these addresses from the Zchain explorer [10]. We then
validated them against the blocks advertised on some of
the websites of the mining pools themselves (which we
also scraped) to ensure that they were the correct tags;
i.e., if the recipient of the coingen transaction in a given
block was tagged as belonging to a given mining pool,
then we checked to see that the block had been advertised
on the website of that mining pool. We then augmented
these sets of addresses with the addresses tagged as be-
longing to founders and miners according to the heuris-
tics developed in Section 6. We present these heuris-
tics in significantly more detail there, but they resulted
in us tagging 123 founder addresses and 110,918 miner
addresses (belonging to a variety of different pools).
5.3 Results
As mentioned in Section 5.1, running Heuristic 1 re-
sulted in 560,319 clusters, of which 97,539 contained
more than a single address. We assigned each cluster
a unique identifier, ordered by the number of addresses
in the cluster, so that the biggest cluster had identifier 0.
5.3.1 Exchanges and wallets
As can be seen in Table 2, many of the exchanges are as-
sociated with some of the biggest clusters, with four out
of the top five clusters belonging to popular exchanges.
In general, we found that the top five clusters accounted
for 11.21% of all transactions. Identifying exchanges is
important, as it makes it possible to discover where indi-
vidual users may have purchased their ZEC. Given exist-
ing and emerging regulations, they are also the one type
of participant in the Zcash ecosystem that might know
the real-world identity of users.
In many of the exchange clusters, we also identified
large fractions of addresses that had been tagged as min-
ers. This implies that individual miners use the addresses
of their exchange accounts to receive their mining re-
ward, which might be expected if their goal is to cash
out directly. We found some, but far fewer, founder ad-
dresses at some of the exchanges as well.
Our clustering also reveals that ShapeShift (Cluster 2)
is fairly heavily used: it had received over 1.1M ZEC in
total and sent roughly the same. Unlike the exchanges,
its cluster contained a relatively small number of miner
addresses (54), which fits with its usage as a way to shift
money, rather than hold it in a wallet.
5.3.2 Mining pools and founders
Although mining pools and founders account for a large
proportion of the activity in Zcash (as we explore in Sec-
tion 6), many re-use the same small set of addresses
frequently, so do not belong to large clusters. For ex-
ample, Flypool had three single-address clusters while
Coinotron, coinmine.pl, Slushpool and Nanopool each
had two single-address clusters. (A list of mining pools
can be found in Table 4 in Section 6.2). Of the coins that
we saw sent from clusters associated with mining pools,
99.8% of it went into the shielded pool, which further
validates both our clustering and tagging techniques.
5.3.3 Philanthropists
Via manual inspection, we identified three large or-
ganizations that accept Zcash donations: the Internet
Archive, torservers.net, and Wikileaks. Of these,
torservers.net accepts payment only via a z-address,
so we cannot identify their transactions (Wikileaks ac-
cepts payment via a z-address too, but also via a t-
address). Of the 31 donations to the Internet Archive
that we were able to identify, which totaled 17.3 ZEC, 9
of them were made anonymously (i.e., as z-to-t transac-
tions). On the other hand, all of the 20 donations to Wik-
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Figure 5: Over time, the amount of ZEC put into the shielded
pool (in red) and the amount taken out of the pool (in blue).
ileak’s t-address were made as t-to-t transactions. None
of these belong to clusters, as they have never sent a
transaction.
6 Interactions with the Shielded Pool
What makes Zcash unique is of course not its t-addresses
(since these essentially replicate the functionality of Bit-
coin), but its shielded pool. To that end, this section ex-
plores interactions with the pool at its endpoints, mean-
ing the deposits into (t-to-z) and withdrawals out of the
pool (z-to-t). We then explore interactions within the
pool (z-to-z transactions) in Section 7.
To begin, we consider just the amounts put into and
taken out of the pool. Over time, 3,901,124 ZEC have
been deposited into the pool,3 and 3,788,889 have been
withdrawn. Figure 5 plots both deposits and withdrawals
over time.
This figure shows a near-perfect reflection of deposits
and withdrawals, demonstrating that most users not only
withdraw the exact number of ZEC they deposit into the
pool, but do so very quickly after the initial deposit. As
we see in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, this phenomenon is ac-
counted for almost fully by the founders and miners.
Looking further at the figure, we can see that the sym-
metry is broken occasionally, and most notably in four
“spikes”: two large withdrawals, and two large deposits.
Some manual investigation revealed the following:
“The early birds” The first withdrawal spike took place
at block height 30,900, which was created in Decem-
ber 2016. The cause of the spike was a single trans-
action in which 7,135 ZEC was taken out of the pool;
given the exchange rate at that time of 34 USD per
ZEC, this was equivalent to 242,590 USD. The coins
were distributed across 15 t-addresses, which initially
3This is greater than the total number of generated coins, as all coins
must be deposited into the pool at least once, by the miners or founders,
but may then go into and out of the pool multiple times.
we had not tagged as belonging to any named user.
After running the heuristic described in Section 6.1,
however, we tagged all of these addresses as belong-
ing to founders. In fact, this was the very first with-
drawal that we identified as being associated with
founders.
“Secret Santa” The second withdrawal spike took
place on December 25 2017, at block height 242,642.
In it, 10,000 ZEC was distributed among 10 different
t-addresses, each receiving 1,000 ZEC. None of these
t-addresses had done a transaction before then, and
none have been involved in one since (i.e., the coins
received in this transaction have not yet been spent).
“One-man wolf packs” Both of the deposit spikes in
the graph correspond to single large deposits from un-
known t-addresses that, using our analysis from Sec-
tion 5, we identified as residing in single-address clus-
ters. For the first spike, however, many of the de-
posited amounts came directly from a founder address
identified by our heuristics (Heuristic 3), so given our
analysis in Section 6.1 we believe this may also be
associated with the founders.
While this figure already provides some information
about how the pool is used (namely that most of the
money put into it is withdrawn almost immediately af-
terwards), it does not tell us who is actually using the
pool. For this, we attempt to associate addresses with the
types of participants identified in Section 3.2: founders,
miners, and ‘other’ (encompassing both services and in-
dividual users).
When considering deposits into the shielded pool, it is
easy to associate addresses with founders and miners, as
the consensus rules dictate that they must put their block
rewards into the shielded pool before spending them fur-
ther. As described in Section 5.2, we tagged founders ac-
cording to the Zcash parameters, and tagged as miners all
recipients of coingen transactions that were not founders.
We then used these tags to identify a founder deposit
as any t-to-z transaction using one or more founder ad-
dresses as input, and a miner deposit as any t-to-z trans-
action using one or more miner addresses as input. The
results are in Figure 6.
Looking at this figure, it is clear that miners are the
main participants putting money into the pool. This is
not particularly surprising, given that all the coins they
receive must be deposited into the pool at least once, so
if we divide that number of coins by the total number
deposited we would expect at least 63.7% of the deposits
to come from miners. (The actual number is 76.7%.)
Founders, on the other hand, don’t put as much money
into the pool (since they don’t have as much to begin
with), but when they do they put in large amounts that
cause visible step-like fluctuations to the overall line.
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Figure 6: Over time, the amount of ZEC deposited into the
shielded pool by miners, founders, and others.
Figure 7: The addresses that have put more than 10,000 ZEC
into the shielded pool over time, where the size of each node is
proportional to the value it has put into the pool. The addresses
of miners are green, of founders are orange, and of unknown
‘other’ participants are purple.
In terms of the heaviest users, we looked at the indi-
vidual addresses that had put more than 10,000 ZEC into
the pool. The results are in Figure 7.
In fact, this figure incorporates the heuristics we de-
velop in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, although it looked very
similar when we ran it before applying our heuristics
(which makes sense, since our heuristics mainly act to
link z-to-t transactions). Nevertheless, it demonstrates
again that most of the heavy users of the pool are miners,
with founders also depositing large amounts but spread-
ing them over a wider variety of addresses. Of the four
‘other’ addresses, one of them belonged to ShapeShift,
and the others belong to untagged clusters.
While it is interesting to look at t-to-z transactions
on their own, the main intention of the shielded pool is
to provide an anonymity set, so that when users with-
draw their coins it is not clear whose coins they are. In
that sense, it is much more interesting to link together
t-to-z and z-to-t transactions, which acts to reduce the
anonymity set. More concretely, if a t-to-z transaction
can be linked to a z-to-t transaction, then those coins can
be “ruled out” of the anonymity set of future users with-
drawing coins from the pool. We thus devote our atten-
tion to this type of analysis for the rest of the section.
The most naı¨ve way to link together these transactions
would be to see if the same addresses are used across
them; i.e., if a miner uses the same address to withdraw
their coins as it did to deposit them. By running this
simple form of linking, we see the results in Figure 8a.
This figure shows that we are not able to identify any
withdrawals as being associated with founders, and only
a fairly small number as associated with miners: 49,280
transactions in total, which account for 13.3% of the total
value in the pool.
Nevertheless, using heuristics that we develop for
identifying founders (as detailed in Section 6.1) and min-
ers (Section 6.2), we are able to positively link most of
the z-to-t activity with one of these two categories, as
seen in Figures 8b and 8c. In the end, of the 177,009 z-
to-t transactions, we were able to tag 120,629 (or 68%) of
them as being associated with miners, capturing 52.1%
of the value coming out of the pool, and 2,103 of them as
being associated with founders (capturing 13.5% of the
value). We then examine the remaining 30-35% of the
activity surrounding the shielded pool in Section 6.3.
6.1 Founders
After comparing the list of founder addresses against the
outputs of all coingen transactions, we found that 14 of
them had been used. Using these addresses, we were
able to identify founder deposits into the pool, as already
shown in Figure 6. Table 3 provides a closer inspection
of the usage of each of these addresses.
This table shows some quite obvious patterns in the
behavior of the founders. At any given time, only one
address is “active,” meaning it receives rewards and de-
posits them into the pool. Once it reaches the limit of
44,272.5 ZEC, the next address takes its place and it is
not used again. This pattern has held from the third ad-
dress onwards. What’s more, the amount deposited was
often the same: exactly 249.9999 ZEC, which is roughly
the reward for 100 blocks. This was true of 74.9% of
all founder deposits, and 96.2% of all deposits from the
third address onwards. There were only ever five other
deposits into the pool carrying value between 249 and
251 ZEC (i.e., carrying a value close but not equal to
249.9999 ZEC).
Thus, while we were initially unable to identify any
withdrawals associated with the founders (as seen in Fig-
ure 8a), these patterns indicated an automated use of
the shielded pool that might also carry into the with-
drawals. Upon examining the withdrawals from the
pool, we did not find any with a value exactly equal to
249.9999 ZEC. We did, however, find 1,953 withdrawals
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(c) Founder and miner heuristics
Figure 8: The z-to-t transactions we associated with miners, founders, and ‘other’, after running some combination of our heuristics.
# Deposits Total value # Deposits (249)
1 548 19,600.4 0
2 252 43,944.6 153
3 178 44,272.5 177
4 192 44,272.5 176
5 178 44,272.5 177
6 178 44,272.5 177
7 178 44,272.5 177
8 178 44,272.5 177
9 190 44,272.5 176
10 188 44,272.5 176
11 190 44,272.5 176
12 178 44,272.5 177
13 191 44,272.5 175
14 70 17,500 70
Total 2889 568,042.5 2164
Table 3: The behavior of each of the 14 active founder ad-
dresses, in terms of the number of deposits into the pool, the
total value deposited (in ZEC), and the number of deposits car-
rying exactly 249.9999 ZEC in value.
of exactly 250.0001 ZEC (and 1,969 carrying a value be-
tween 249 and 251 ZEC, although we excluded the extra
ones from our analysis).
The value alone of these withdrawals thus provides
some correlation with the deposits, but to further explore
it we also looked at the timing of the transactions. When
we examined the intervals between consecutive deposits
of 249.9999 ZEC, we found that 85% happened within
6-10 blocks of the previous one. Similarly, when ex-
amining the intervals between consecutive withdrawals
of 250.0001 ZEC, we found that 1,943 of the 1,953
withdrawals also had a proximity of 6-10 blocks. In-
deed, both the deposits and the withdrawals proceeded
in step-like patterns, in which many transactions were
made within a very small number of blocks (resulting
in the step up), at which point there would be a pause
while more block rewards were accumulated (the step
across). This pattern is visible in Figure 9, which shows
the deposit and withdrawal transactions associated with
the founders. Deposits are typically made in few large
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Figure 9: Over time, the founder deposits into the pool (in red)
and withdrawals from the pool (in blue), after running Heuris-
tic 3.
steps, whereas withdrawals take many smaller ones.
Heuristic 3. Any z-to-t transaction carrying 250.0001
ZEC in value is done by the founders.
In terms of false positives, we cannot truly know how
risky this heuristic is, short of asking the founders. This
is in contrast to the t-address clustering heuristics pre-
sented in Section 5, in which we were not attempting to
assign addresses to a specific owner, so could validate
the heuristics in other ways. Nevertheless, the high cor-
relation between both the value and timing of the trans-
actions led us to believe in the reliability of this heuristic.
As a result of running this heuristic, we added 75 more
addresses to our initial list of 48 founder addresses (of
which, again, only 14 had been used). Aside from the
correlation showed in Figure 9, the difference in terms
of our ability to tag founder withdrawals is seen in Fig-
ure 8b.
6.2 Miners
The Zcash protocol specifies that all newly generated
coins are required to be put into the shielded pool be-
fore they can be spent further. As a result, we expect that
a large quantity of the ZEC being deposited into the pool
are from addresses associated with miners.
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Name Addresses t-to-z z-to-t
Flypool 3 65,631 3
F2Pool 1 742 720
Nanopool 2 8319 4107
Suprnova 1 13,361 0
Coinmine.pl 2 3211 0
Waterhole 1 1439 5
BitClub Pool 1 196 1516
MiningPoolHub 1 2625 0
Dwarfpool 1 2416 1
Slushpool 1 941 0
Coinotron 2 9726 0
Nicehash 1 216 0
MinerGate 1 13 0
Zecmine.pro 1 6 0
Table 4: A summary of our identified mining pool activity, in
terms of the number of associated addresses used in coingen
transactions, and the numbers of each type of transaction inter-
acting with the pool.
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Figure 10: Over time, the value of deposits made by known
mining pools into the shielded pool.
6.2.1 Deposits
As discussed earlier and seen in Figure 6, it is easy to
identify miner deposits into the pool due to the fact that
they immediately follow a coin generation. Before go-
ing further, we split the category of miners into indi-
vidual miners, who operate on their own, and mining
pools, which represent collectives of potentially many
individuals. In total, we gathered 19 t-addresses associ-
ated with Zcash mining pools, using the scraping meth-
ods described in Section 5.2. Table 4 lists these mining
pools, as well as the number of addresses they control
and the number of t-to-z transactions we associated with
them. Figure 10 plots the value of their deposits into the
shielded pool over time.
In this figure, we can clearly see that the two domi-
nant mining pools are Flypool and F2Pool. Flypool con-
sistently deposits the same (or similar) amounts, which
we can see in their linear representation. F2Pool, on the
other hand, has bursts of large deposits mixed with pe-
riods during which it is not very active, which we can
also see reflected in the graph. Despite their different be-
haviors, the amount deposited between the two pools is
similar.
6.2.2 Withdrawals
While the withdrawals from the pool do not solely re-use
the small number of mining addresses identified using
deposits (as we saw in our naı¨ve attempt to link miner
z-to-t transactions in Figure 8a), they do typically re-use
some of them, so can frequently be identified anyway.
In particular, mining pool payouts in Zcash are sim-
ilar to how many of them are in Bitcoin [27, 18]. The
block reward is often paid into a single address, con-
trolled by the operator of the pool, and the pool operator
then deposits some set of aggregated block rewards into
the shielded pool. They then pay the individual reward
to each of the individual miners as a way of “sharing the
pie,” which results in z-to-t transactions with many out-
puts. (In Bitcoin, some pools opt for this approach while
some form a “peeling chain” in which they pay each
individual miner in a separate transaction, sending the
change back to themselves each time.) In the payouts for
some of the mining pools, the list of output t-addresses
sometimes includes one of the t-addresses known to be
associated with the mining pool already. We thus tag
these types of payouts as belonging to the mining pool,
according to the following heuristic:
Heuristic 4. If a z-to-t transaction has over 100 output t-
addresses, one of which belongs to a known mining pool,
then we label the transaction as a mining withdrawal (as-
sociated with that pool), and label all non-pool output
t-addresses as belonging to miners.
As with Heuristic 3, short of asking the mining pool
operators directly it is impossible to validate this heuris-
tic. Nevertheless, given the known operating structure
of Bitcoin mining pools and the way this closely mirrors
that structure, we again believe it to be relatively safe.
As a result of running this heuristic, we tagged
110,918 addresses as belonging to miners, and linked a
much more significant portion of the z-to-t transactions,
as seen in Figure 8c. As the last column in Table 4
shows, however, this heuristic captured the activity of
only a small number of the mining pools, and the large
jump in linked activity is mostly due to the high cov-
erage with F2Pool (one of the two richest pools). This
implies that further heuristics developed specifically for
other pools, such as Flypool, would increase the linka-
bility even more. Furthermore, a more active strategy in
which we mined with the pools to receive payouts would
reveal their structure, at which point (according to the
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1.1M deposited by Flypool shown in Figure 10 and the
remaining value of 1.2M attributed to the ‘other’ cate-
gory shown in Figure 8c) we would shrink the anonymity
set even further.4
6.3 Other Entities
Once the miners and founders have been identified, we
can assume the remaining transactions belong to more
general entities. In this section we look into different
means of categorizing these entities in order to identify
how the shielded pool is being used.
In particular, we ran the heuristic due to Ques-
nelle [37], which said that if a unique value (i.e., a value
never seen in the blockchain before or since) is deposited
into the pool and then, after some short period of time,
the exact same value is withdrawn from the pool, the de-
posit and the withdrawal are linked in what he calls a
round-trip transaction.
Heuristic 5. [37] For a value v, if there exists exactly one
t-to-z transaction carrying value v and one z-to-t transac-
tion carrying value v, where the z-to-t transaction hap-
pened after the t-to-z one and within some small number
of blocks, then these transactions are linked.
In terms of false positives, the fact that the value is
unique in the blockchain means that the only possibil-
ity of a false positive is if some of the z-to-z transac-
tions split or aggregated coins in such a way that another
deposit (or several other deposits) of a different amount
were altered within the pool to yield an amount identical
to the initial deposit. While this is possible in theory, we
observe that of the 12,841 unique values we identified,
9,487 of them had eight decimal places (the maximum
number in Zcash), and 98.9% of them had more than
three decimal places. We thus view it as highly unlikely
that these exact values were achieved via manipulations
in z-to-z transactions.
By running this heuristic, we identified 12,841 unique
values, which means we linked 12,841 transactions. The
values total 1,094,513.23684 ZEC and represent 28.5%
of all coins ever deposited in the pool. Interestingly, most
(87%) of the linked coins were in transactions attributed
to the founders and miners, so had already been linked
by our previous heuristics. We believe this lends further
credence to their soundness. In terms of the block inter-
val, we ran Heuristic 5 for every interval between 1 and
100 blocks; the results are in Figure 11.
As this figure shows, even if we assume a conservative
block interval of 10 (meaning the withdrawal took place
4It is possible that we have already captured some of the Flypool
activity, as many of the miners receive payouts from multiple pools.
We thus are not claiming that all remaining activity could be attributed
to Flypool, but potentially some substantial portion.
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Figure 11: The value linked by Heuristic 5, as a function of
the block interval required between the deposit and withdrawal
transactions.
25 minutes after the deposit), we still capture 70% of the
total value, or over 700K ZEC. If we require the with-
drawal to have taken place within an hour of the deposit,
we get 83%.
7 Interactions within the Shielded Pool
In this section we consider private transactions; i.e., z-to-
z transactions that interact solely with the shielded pool.
As seen in Section 4.1, these transactions form a small
percentage of the overall transactions. However, z-to-z
transactions form a crucial part of the anonymity core of
Zcash. In particular, they make it difficult to identify the
round-trip transactions from Heuristic 5.
Our analysis identified 6,934 z-to-z transactions, with
8,444 vJoinSplits. As discussed in Section 3.1, the only
information revealed by z-to-z transactions is the miner’s
fee, the time of the transaction, and the number of vJoin-
Splits used as input. Of these, we looked at the time of
transactions and the number of vJoinSplits in order to
gain some insight as to the use of these operations.
We found that 93% of z-to-z transactions took just one
vJoinSplit as input. Since each vJoinSplit can have at
most two shielded outputs as its input, the majority of
z-to-z transactions thus take no more than two shielded
outputs as their input. This increases the difficulty of cat-
egorizing z-to-z transactions, because we cannot know if
a small number of users are making many transactions,
or many users are making one transaction.
In looking at the timing of z-to-z transactions, how-
ever, we conclude that it is likely that a small number of
users were making many transactions. Figure 12 plots
the cumulative number of vJoinSplits over time. The
occurrences of vJoinSplits are somewhat irregular, with
17% of all vJoinSplits occurring in January 2017. There
are four other occasions when a sufficient number of
vJoinSplits occur within a sufficiently short period of
time as to be visibly noticeable. It seems likely that these
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Figure 12: The number of z-to-z vJoinSplits over time.
occurrences belong to the same group of users, or at least
by users interacting with the same service.
Finally, looking back at the number of t-to-z and z-
to-t transactions identified with mining pools in Table 4,
it is possible that BitClub Pool is responsible for up to
1,300 of the z-to-z transactions, as it had 196 deposits
into the pool and 1,516 withdrawals. This can happen
only because either (1) the pool made extra z-to-z trans-
actions, or (2) it sent change from its z-to-t transactions
back into the shielded pool. As most of BitClub Pool’s
z-to-t transactions had over 200 output t-addresses, how-
ever, we conclude that the former explanation is more
likely.
8 Case Study: The Shadow Brokers
The Shadow Brokers (TSB) are a hacker collective that
has been active since the summer of 2016, and that leaks
tools supposedly created by the NSA. Some of these
leaks are released as free samples, but many are sold via
auctions and as monthly bundles. Initially, TSB accepted
payment only using Bitcoin. Later, however, they be-
gan to accept Zcash for their monthly dump service. In
this section we discuss how we identified t-to-z transac-
tions that could represent payments to TSB. We identi-
fied twenty-four clusters (created using our analysis in
Section 5) matching our criteria for potential TSB cus-
tomers, one of which could be a regular customer.
8.1 Techniques
In order to identify the transactions that are most likely
to be associated with TSB, we started by looking at
their blog [5]. In May 2017, TSB announced that they
would be accepting Zcash for their monthly dump ser-
vice. Throughout the summer (June through August)
they accepted both Zcash and Monero, but in Septem-
ber they announced that they would accept only Zcash.
Table 5 summarizes the amount they were requesting in
May/June July August September October
100 200
400
500 100
200
500
500
Table 5: Amounts charged for TSB monthly dumps, in ZEC. In
July and September TSB offered different prices depending on
which exploits were being purchased.
each of these months. The last blog post was made in Oc-
tober 2017, when they stated that all subsequent dumps
would cost 500 ZEC.
To identify potential TSB transactions, we thus looked
at all t-to-z transactions not associated with miners or
founders that deposited either 100, 200, 400, or 500 ZEC
± 5 ZEC. Our assumption was that users paying TSB
were not likely to be regular Zcash users, but rather were
using it with the main purpose of making the payment.
On this basis, addresses making t-to-z transactions of the
above values were flagged as a potential TSB customer
if the following conditions held:
1. They did not get their funds from the pool; i.e., there
were no z-to-t transactions with this address as an
output. Again, if this were a user mainly engaging
with Zcash as a way to pay TSB, they would need to
to buy their funds from an exchange, which engage
only with t-addresses.
2. They were not a frequent user, in the sense that they
had not made or received more than 250 transac-
tions (ever).
3. In the larger cluster in which this address belonged,
the total amount deposited by the entire cluster into
the pool within one month was within 1 ZEC of
the amounts requested by TSB. Here, because the
resulting clusters were small enough to treat man-
ually, we applied not only Heuristic 1 but also
Heuristic 2 (clustering by change), making sure to
weed out false positives. Again, the idea was that
suspected TSB customers would not be frequent
users of the pool.
As with our previous heuristics, there is no way to
quantify the false-positive risks associated with this set
of criteria, although we see below that many of the trans-
actions matching it did occur in the time period associ-
ated with TSB acceptance of Zcash. Regardless, given
this limitation we are not claiming that our results are
definitive, but do believe this to be a realistic set of crite-
ria that might be applied in the context of a law enforce-
ment investigation attempting to narrow down potential
suspects.
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Month 100 200 400 500
October (2016) 0 0 0 0
November 0 0 0 0
December 0 0 0 0
January (2017) 1 0 0 0
February 0 0 0 0
March 0 0 0 0
April 0 0 0 0
May (before) 0 0 0 0
May (after) 3 1 0 0
June 2 1 1 0
July 1 2 0 0
August 1 0 0 1
September 0 0 0 0
October 2 0 0 0
November 1 0 0 0
December 2 3 0 1
January (2018) 0 1 0 0
Table 6: Number of clusters that put the required amounts
(±1 ZEC) into the shielded pool.
8.2 Results
Our results, in terms of the number of transactions
matching our requirements above up until 17 January
2018, are summarized in Table 6. Before the first TSB
blog post in May, we found only a single matching trans-
action. This is very likely a false positive, but demon-
strates that the types of transactions we were seeking
were not common before TSB went live with Zcash. Af-
ter the blog post, we flagged five clusters in May and
June for the requested amount of 100 ZEC. There were
only two clusters that was flagged for 500 ZEC, one of
which was from August. No transactions of any of the
required quantities were flagged in September, despite
the fact that TSB switched to accepting only Zcash in
September. This is possible for a number of reasons:
our criteria may have caused us to miss transactions, or
maybe there were no takers. From October onwards we
flagged between 1-6 transactions per month. It is hard to
know if these represent users paying for old data dumps
or are simply false positives.
Four out of the 24 transactions in Table 6 are highly
likely to be false positives. First, there is the deposit
of 100 ZEC into the pool in January, before TSB an-
nounced their first blog post. This cluster put an addi-
tional 252 ZEC into the pool in March, so is likely just
some user of the pool. Second and third, there are two
deposits of 200 ZEC into the pool in June, before TSB
announced that one of the July dump prices would cost
200 ZEC. Finally, there is a deposit of 400 ZEC into the
pool in June before TSB announced that one of the July
dump prices would cost 400 ZEC.
Of the remaining clusters, there is one whose activ-
ity is worth discussing. From this cluster, there was one
deposit into the pool in June for 100 ZEC, one in July
for 200 ZEC, and one in August for 500 ZEC, matching
TSB prices exactly. The cluster belonged to a new user,
and most of the money in this user’s cluster came directly
from Bitfinex (Cluster 3).
9 Conclusions
This paper has provided the first in-depth exploration of
Zcash, with a particular focus on its anonymity guaran-
tees. To achieve this, we applied both well-known clus-
tering heuristics that have been developed for Bitcoin and
attribution heuristics we developed ourselves that take
into account Zcash’s shielded pool and its unique cast
of characters. As with previous empirical analyses of
other cryptocurrencies, our study has shown that most
users are not taking advantage of the main privacy fea-
ture of Zcash at all. Furthermore, the participants who
do engage with the shielded pool do so in a way that is
identifiable, which has the effect of significantly erod-
ing the anonymity of other users by shrinking the overall
anonymity set.
Future work
Our study was an initial exploration, and thus left many
avenues open for further exploration. For example, it
may be possible to classify more z-to-z transactions by
analyzing the time intervals between the transactions in
more detail, or by examining other metadata such as the
miner’s fee or even the size (in bytes) of the transac-
tion. Additionally, the behavior of mining pools could
be further identified by a study that actively interacts with
them.
Suggestions for improvement
Our heuristics would have been significantly less effec-
tive if the founders interacting with the pool behaved in
a less regular fashion. In particular, by always withdraw-
ing the same amount in the same time intervals, it became
possible to distinguish founders withdrawing funds from
other users. Given that the founders are both highly in-
vested in the currency and knowledgeable about how to
use it in a secure fashion, they are in the best place to
ensure the anonymity set is large.
Ultimately, the only way for Zcash to truly ensure the
size of its anonymity set is to require all transactions to
take place within the shielded pool, or otherwise signifi-
cantly expand the usage of it. This may soon be compu-
tationally feasible given emerging advances in the under-
lying cryptographic techniques [6], or even if more main-
stream wallet providers like Jaxx roll out support for z-
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addresses. More broadly, we view it as an interesting reg-
ulatory question whether or not mainstream exchanges
would continue to transact with Zcash if it switched to
supporting only z-addresses.
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